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The everyday practice of evaluation has continued 
for millennia, only recently sprouting an academic 
branch that became more sophisticated and 
transformed into an important discipline. More 
precisely, it developed into a family of sub-
disciplines—product evaluation, program eval-
uation, personnel evaluation, policy analysis, etc. 
At the metalevel, the perception of it in most of the 
academic world has undergone some highly 
significant shifts, separated by what can fairly be 
described as revolutions. That sequence is what I 
try to describe below, starting with a description of 
the pre-revolutionary baseline state. The list 
extends from the past, through the present, and 
into the future, the latter including some 
suggestions about revolutions I think we need to 
kickstart. Most evaluators will continue to spend 
most of their time on applied evaluation in some 
specialty field, but I’m hoping they will help out 
part-time with the revolutions, at least by thinking 
and arguing about them. Better still if they are 
intrigued and challenged by the suggestions for 
future revolutions, and add their own experience 
to the revolutionary task—or to a counter-
revolutionary reaction.  
	  
0.	   Practical	   Evaluation	   from	  Prehistory	  
to	  Present	  
 
We can see the modern version of this practical 
process by watching a young language-learning 
child begin, with your help, to get a grasp on ‘good 
move’ and ‘bad move’ in the context of card and 
video games and building blocks. We’ll call that 
‘good1’ and ‘bad1.’ Concurrently, she’s also trying 
to get a grasp on ‘good2’ and ‘bad2’, meaning ‘what 
mommy thinks is good/bad’ i.e., ‘nice/naughty’, 
and eventually she connects the two concepts, but 
that’s hard. Hard enough that I bet you have to 
think for a minute to be able to explain what the 
connection is. 1  Essentially they start as two 
different concepts for her, like two definitions of 
temperature for a student taking a first  science 
course (e.g., what the thermometer reads and what 
thermodynamics is about), and much confusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 She may begin with an implicit grasp of the idea that ‘good’ is 
what brings the speaker closer to what they want to do, and she 
only gradually comes to see that it’s more than this, because 
sometimes what her little brother, or even herself, wants to do 
is not good, at least not according to her parents. When is that 
so; and who is right when her parents disagree, or disagree with 




and frustration results, since parents often think 
they’re the same for her since they’re using the 
same term for each, or even that it’s stupid of her 
not to understand that both concepts are really 
one. And of course, the parents often argue about 
what is good/bad or right/wrong, which doesn’t 
help her climb the learning curve. 
She’s essentially struggling with the 
information-processing precursor of 
understanding theoretical concepts. It would be 
much easier for her if her parents were always very 
careful to give reasons for identifying actions as 
good or bad, e.g., unfair to others, or forbidden by 
God. However, we all do get hold of some general 
concept of evaluation, sooner or later, though not 
with great clarity, and, perhaps surprisingly for 
something so untidy, the good1/bad1 version at 
least is an enormously useful concept. It is not only 
crucial for improving our decisions and plans 
across the whole span of our life, but for improving 
our designing/making/modifying of artifacts and 
environments, and our perspectives on ourselves, 
others, and the world’s story, from all of which we 
learn about our mistakes and triumphs, a kind of 
learning that can greatly improve our actions, 
futures, and reflections. 
 Direct instruction in the logic and limits of the 
evaluation process, in both its formative and 
summative—and even its ascriptive—roles, is 
arguably a serious omission from the standard 
curriculum of public education. That gap is partly 
due to the negative reaction that ostracized 
evaluation from the legitimate sphere of scientific 
concepts for half a century, courtesy of the 
positivist philosophy of science, but also perhaps 
due to excessive anxiety about evaluation because 
of its ego-threat, and no doubt also to the lack of 
any standardized, systematic approach. The 
nearest approach is perhaps the teaching of critical 
thinking, and the frequent opposition to that, 
especially because it can lead to doubting some 
parental edicts, is poorly matched by the limited or 
non-existent training for teachers to defend it or 
instruct in it. 
At this point, another important role of 
evaluation needs to be mentioned, one that 
certainly required the development of language in 
order to appear. It is in fact a role that contributes 
to the evolutionary payoffs from having a language 
and supports advanced cognitive development. It’s 
clear this function has been poorly understood and 
appreciated, and I’m going to preface my list of 
revolutions that we’ve endured or need to kickstart 
by pointing it out, because it’s homely, useful, and 
relatively non-threatening—and needs to be 
included in explicating evaluation’s functions. I 
have suggested names for the first three functions 
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that have achieved some currency, namely 
summative evaluation, formative evaluation, and 
ascriptive evaluation, so I’m going to suggest we 
add a fourth role to those—the compressive role, 
i.e., the function of evaluation as an invaluable and 
extremely powerful information-compressor of a 
particularly useful kind of information. The 
example I’ve often given of this because it’s right 
under our teaching and learning noses much of 
our time in school and outside it, is the well-tested 
one of the academic grade. At the end of three 
months of talking to the students in one of our 
classes, reading their writings, and considering 
their questions and their answers to our questions, 
we have, let’s hope, acquired a sense of their ability 
in the particular domain of skills or knowledge 
that we are covering. We need to record that 
conclusion, so that others, with a need to know 
and a right to know, can combine the summaries 
of performance provided by the range of 
instructors that cover the curriculum into an 
overall summative evaluation of the student’s 
competence that will facilitate decisions by those 
selecting students for further education or awards 
or jobs. We may also hope that this summary, the 
single course grade or—at the more general level—
the Grade Point Average, will also serve as a 
formative evaluation of some use to the student, 
for his or her own decision-making and 
improvement-making. In order to perform these 
worthy functions, each instructor condenses their 
evaluative summary into—amazingly, although 
with notable costs—a single letter, usually chosen 
from a small set of five or less, (A, B, C, D, F 
(a.k.a., E, in some countries); or P/NP (a.k.a., S/U 
(Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory)), or perhaps from a 
few more of dubious marginal validity if we add 
pluses and minuses.2 
Now, isn’t this just a case of convenient text 
design for our old friends formative, summative, 
and ascriptive? Well, ‘convenient’ is a bit mean-
spirited for this characteristic: success in 
compressing valuable information by a factor of 
thousands or millions is a survival characteristic in 
itself, as with good graphic illustration and good 
meta-analysis, because it means that when time is 
short or your memory is overburdened, you can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 At least two distinguished institutions—St. John’s and the 
University of California at Santa Cruz—have long refused to 
accept this ‘ruthless bondage,’ instead convening a committee 
to write a text account of the student’s achievements. But what 
often happens, perhaps normally happens—apart from a large 
increase in labor costs—is that the next decision-maker in the 
chain of users (a role I have often had to play) executes the 
compression for them, without their permission or preference, 
converting the text to a grade (in order to get comparability), 
almost certainly less well than they could have done. 
get or have handy in your head the information 
you need, not diluted with relevant but not 
critically helpful noise. For example, your medical 
needs probably don’t include knowing details 
about the relative merits and side-effects of all the 
analgesics on the market—you just want to know 
the best one for you in your present condition, and 
that’s exactly what your physician, if you are 
fortunate enough to have such a person available, 
can tell you. And s/he can tell you this just 
because—and only because—s/he has evaluated 
them, with skills based on available reports and 
experience. 
Program evaluations, or executive summaries, 
that are too long for the client or his/her execs to 
read carefully, like oral medicines that are too 
large to swallow, must be recorded by the meta-
evaluator as failures, because pragmatic 
considerations are just as important as content 
validity in the pragmatic enterprise of the 
evaluation consultant. 3  I think that evaluation 
theorists should start paying more attention to 
systematic analysis of these pragmatic criteria of 
merit—Michael Quinn Patton’s initial shove in that 
direction got us thinking and acting much better in 
this zone, but I think we have not extended the 
logical analysis much further after these many 
years. One way of approaching that extension 
might be to say that in evaluating evaluation 
consulting and reports, one should be focusing 
heavily on the values of significance, outcomes, 
and cost-effectiveness rather than just on merit 
(which mostly means validity and coverage). 
Another dimension to cover is the informatics one 
suggested above in discussing the concision 
requirement (a.k.a., compressive function) of 
evaluation. I have elsewhere used that approach 
quite successfully for the related problem of the 
logical analysis of explanation, by applying 
informatics to it.4 And I think evaluation can only 
be understood thoroughly (e.g., defined, or applied 
to itself) when we get it into that framework; so I 
put that task on the front burner for heating up 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Not necessarily true in the more academic world of ascriptive 
evaluation—e.g., the historian’s usual world—since the old 
pragmatic constraints on length of books hardly apply to the 
cloud. 
4  “The Psycho-Logic of Modern  Science” pp. 47-79 in The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, Noetic Sciences 
Press, 1994, also at michaelscriven.info. After doing a doctoral 
thesis on the logic of explanation and forty years more work on 
various approaches to it, I only found an adequate solution in 
terms of informatics. 
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1.	  Fifty	  years	  an	  Outcast	  	  
 
The first revolution was an attempted genocide. 
When the emerging social sciences, at the turn of 
the 19th into the 20th century, sought an account of 
the scientific method that had been followed by the 
immensely successful physical and biological 
sciences, they made a very bad choice. They 
bought into logical positivism, as preached by the 
Vienna Circle. That meant condemning all 
evaluation to the status of the untouchables—part 
of the huge range of essentially unscientific 
propositions, along with non-propositional 
utterances like commands, exclamations, and 
questions. The positivists gave various reasons for 
doing this, but the leading group of these reasons 
was based on the claim that evaluative 
propositions were essentially mere statements of 
personal preference or expressions of taste, and 
hence entirely subjective and of no scientific status 
or interest. This is of course a generalization (and 
of course an evaluative one, hence self-refuting), 
and so the first question to be asked is whether the 
sample on which it was based was a representative 
sample of the population about which the 
conclusion is drawn. The answer is that it was an 
absurdly biased sample, since not only the two 
largest sub-populations of existing evaluative 
claims, but also (and distinctly) the most 
important one within the social scientists’ fields, 
are not mere matters of taste. 
The largest sub-population is of course the set 
of practical evaluations from everyday life in the 
produce markets, work, and home, which 
continued their valuable services unruffled by the 
blunders of bad social science methodology. Of 
course, there were plenty of ‘mere expressions of 
personal (or family) taste’ amongst these justified 
evaluations of produce, products, or projects, but 
these were treated correctly, mostly as valuable 
information for the food or financial shopper (i.e., 
needs assessment data). Of course, quite a few of 
them, e.g., claims about the best football team or 
sculptor or beer, were claims to truth that could 
not be substantiated, hence mere opinion 
masquerading as factual claims. But there were 
millions or perhaps billions of overlooked well-
substantiated evaluative claims there. 
 However, the truly tragic error was the failure 
to recognize that the very sciences on whose 
supposed methodology the ostracism was based 
were themselves imbued from top to bottom with 
evaluative claims for which good evidence was 
provided and accepted—claims about data quality, 
the merit of theories, the quality of journals, the 
superiority of certain instrument-makers, the 
brilliance of scientists and students. The only good 
news is that evaluation eventually survived this 
attempt at assassination. 
 
2.	  The	  Return	  to	  Respectability 
 
Long before the editors of social science journals 
lifted their ban on evaluation articles, the work of 
Ralph Tyler and other renegades—comprehensive, 
quantitative, and careful—began to make the 
‘value-free  science’ doctrine look like a bias rather 
than a benefit. As the AEA and now a hundred 
similar organizations in other countries moved to 
a level of multi- thousands of members, as 
evaluation-specific journals moved up the usual 
library rating scales, as the number of models and 
checklists and training centers increased, it 
became clear that we had a new profession on our 
hands. But did we have a discipline? 
 
3.	  The	  Alpha	  Discipline	  role	  	  
 
At first it appeared so, and I began to work on 
some of the metaquestions that have to be 
answered in any overview of a sprouting discipline. 
In particular, I was interested in the way that 
evaluation could be and should be applied to 
itself—a process I called meta-evaluation. Then I 
got interested in the way in which evaluation 
turned up in other disciplines, and activities like 
sports and business, in the form of some kind of 
quality control mechanism. It was encouraging to 
find that evaluation, like statistics and 
communications, had a powerful service function 
in all disciplines; to refer to this feature I 
introduced the term ‘transdiscipline.’ 
However, it was somewhat depressing to 
discover that one of the three big organizations 
providing this service commercially, for 
businesses, had managed to completely exclude 
ethical considerations from its checklist of criteria 
of merit.5 Also depressing was the discovery that 
the great classic disciplines, although they thought 
they had a quality control system, in fact the 
procedure that everyone immediately put forward 
as performing that function—peer review—turned 
out to have been hardly ever studied for simple but 
essential virtues like reliability and validity, and 
when Chris Coryn got down to details and actually 
did study it seriously, he found that, as this is 
commonly done, even at the national level, e.g., for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 They have now attempted to remedy this flaw, perhaps partly 
because of the roasting they got when they presented at the 
doctoral evaluation seminar at Western Michigan University, 
Kalamazoo. 
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funding research, it is a bad parody of the real 
thing, almost completely worthless in most cases. 
A huge Stanford study by John Ioannidis, recently 
concluded, addresses the other famous test of 
scientific validity—replicability—with equally 
astonishing, and depressing, results, roughly that 
virtually no-one, including some original 
discoverers of the most important medical 
breakthroughs in recent years, could replicate 
their famous results in a repetition of the original 
experiment.6 
One moral of all this is that evaluators have a 
public responsibility to continue this kind of 
work—checking that the transdisciplinary function 
of evaluation is really serving other disciplines, not 
just having the name of evaluation taken in vain. 
And of course suggesting ways to improve the way 
it’s done, when we find fault. 
But there is another lesson to be learnt, and it 
counts heavily against the status of evaluation as a 
discipline. Not that we’re likely to be run out of 
town, given the shortcomings of the town’s senior 
citizens, but we really must get more serious about 
meta-evaluation (i.e., having our own work 
evaluated by external evaluators), which means 
not only doing this as part of standard procedure—
as the ANSI standards, i.e., the US standards, 
require—but doing it well and publicizing the 
results. We can’t persuasively talk the talk unless 
we walk the walk, and we must realize that 
professional evaluation is, by its very nature, 
particularly vulnerable to the kind of flaw we’ve 
been finding in other disciplines. This is because 
our real world practice is largely in the role of 
consultant, and consultants’ work does not 
normally undergo peer review. We need to tighten 
up the trashy way peer review is done in other 
disciplines and use serious meta-evaluation to fill 
the gap in our own emerging discipline with 
respect to the job that we say (and can prove) that 
peer review ought to be done in the other 
disciplines. 
It’s also true that we have that duty because we 
are by definition the only discipline whose job-
description includes the evaluation of evaluation 
procedures; hence we need to be especially careful, 
when judging others, that we are innocent of the 
crimes we blame them for. Just in case you think 
this is overkill, talk to anyone who has worked in 
international aid evaluation in the last 30 years, 
and get enlightened.  Billions of dollars have been 
misspent there, and billions of people cheated of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 It should be mentioned here that Ernie House was an inspired 
leader of this line of criticism with his own fine work on the 
corruption of the FDA review panels on which the commercial 
distribution of new drugs depends. 
help they should have received, because of 
improper practice in evaluation and its use, from 
poor selection through poor design to lack of 
follow-up. I spent a couple of years as the external 
evaluator for the Bill and Melinda Gates East 
Africa project (working pro bono), and for all my 
admiration and indeed affection for what they are 
doing in terms of intentions, they would still be 
one of my prime examples in talking about how 
not to use evaluation. 
What I’ve been talking about here is the role of 
the discipline of evaluation in studying how 
evaluation is done in other disciplines—important 
because without a satisfactory answer, they would 
not qualify as disciplines, since disciplines by 
definition have to meet high standards of 
methodological merit. I call this function the role 
of evaluation as the alpha discipline, because a 
would-be discipline must pass the standards for 
which we are responsible, nominally at least. This 
watchdog role also must, of course, include 
inspections, and instructions on how to apply and 
enforce these rules in order to be classified as a 
discipline. The need here is evidenced by the ease 
with which I was able to think of ten inexpensive 
ways to improve the evaluation of research 
proposals so that it becomes a reasonably reliable 
procedure.7 
 But there’s a worse problem, methodologically 
speaking, not politically or sociologically or 
ethically speaking— that we have to fix in order 
that we ourselves can qualify as a respectable 
discipline. Earlier on I said that my first candidate 
for a ‘revolution we should be leading’ is better 
understanding of the pragmatics of the concept of 
evaluation. Now, I think some of you may be 
supposing that by reference to pragmatics I’m just 
talking about practical or real world consider-
ations. After all, that’s what ‘pragmatic’ means. 
But that’s not the essence of what I’m talking 
about. The plural word, ‘pragmatics’ has a stricter 
meaning from the singular one (what fun it must 
be to learn English when you’re not a kid!). And 
it’s the plural word I’m talking about: here’s the 
definition in the ‘mother of all dictionaries’—the 
Oxford English Dictionary: “(The study of) the use 
of linguistic signs (especially sentences) in actual 
situations.” 
 I think we can treat ‘situations’ as including 
both the signer’s circumstances and his or her (or 
its) context. The use of the term “pragmatics” 
implies a contrast with alternatives in a particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In Scriven, M., & Coryn, C.L.S. (2008). The logic of research 
evaluation. New Directions for Evaluation, (118), 89-106. 
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triad of analytic points of view: syntactics, sem-
antics, and pragmatics. Classical formal logic—
from Aristotle through Godel and Carnap—was 
about syntactics. It morphed into semantics with 
the post-positivists, and made the big shift to 
pragmatics with Wittgenstein (not that he used or 
would have liked that name for his approach). It is 
also close to a strand in what is often called critical 
thinking, informal logic, rhetoric, or 
argumentation. I am afraid we won’t have a secure 
discipline of evaluation until we have done a full 
analysis of the pragmatics of that concept, which 
today certainly includes looking at the informatics 
aspects of its use. Why is this important? 
 First, notice that despite the weakness in their 
quality control system, thermodynamics (like most 
of the classical disciplines) does meet this standard 
for clear, albeit implicit, definition of its core 
concept. We should meet it too, even though it’s 
harder for us to do because our primary concept 
can’t be defined via a network of governing laws in 
the way that physical concepts can; it has to be 
defined via pragmatics (e.g., ostensive definition—
definition by pointing at examples—to use the old 
term for a notably early procedure in pragmatics). 
We have to adopt this somewhat unusual way to 
define it, because it’s that kind of concept, 
although this elusive nature was one of the reasons 
it was cast into outer darkness for half a century, 
with its specter still haunting social scientists even 
today. And we are still some way from completing 
that project, although Jane Davidson and I are 
making a start with trying to identify what we’re 
calling ‘evaluation-specific methodology.’ I hope 
we can get some help with that project from some 
of you.8 
 But that’s not the only reason we need to put 
some work into cleaning up our own field. It’s also 
partly because we won’t get clear about the status 
of the highly prominent current theory-based 
approach to evaluation until we’re entirely clear 
about the relation of explanation to evaluation, 
which requires pragmatics. More importantly, in 
fact crucially, it’s important because we cannot 
give a thorough account of evaluation’s function, 
its limitations, and its prerequisites, without 
analyzing its pragmatics. In other words, the core 
of evaluation, the backbone of our discipline, the 
key to what distinguishes it from traditional social 
science, cannot be set out without covering its 
pragmatics. For those of you not excited about 
getting the logical analysis right, let me segue into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  And there is a little bit of funding support available for 
research related to that project from the Faster Forward Fund, 
which will be laid out in a future issue of JMDE, with space for 
questions and answers. 
another line of reasoning for the same conclusion, 
by moving to the next era. But as a Parthian shot, 
let me say that one of the key elements in the 
pragmatics of evaluative reasoning is uncovering 
and explicating a third mode of valid reasoning 
beside deduction and induction, a quest for the 
Holy Grail that has been tried without success for a 
thousand years or so. I think we’re now close to 
having found the ‘Third Way’ of reasoning; and 
that will make evaluation itself much clearer. 
 
4.	  The	  Exemplar	  Role 
 
At least we’ve made a start on everything 
mentioned so far, which make possible the first 
needed revolution. We’ll call this necessary toolbox 
for the alpha role, the advanced logic of evaluation, 
which has to be able to deal with the evaluation of 
disciplines and not just the usual evaluands like 
programs and products.9 Although we do have a 
good slice of that toolkit in working shape, we still 
have substantially more to do, and then we have to 
compress it into good teaching materials. But the 
next two items are really only hopes at this point, 
although a little easier to explain than the first. 
 The second needed revolution is a role 
reversal. Some leading texts on evaluation describe 
evaluation as a branch of social science, which is 
surely not true since the social sciences have no 
methodology for dealing with evaluative 
propositions, and are only partially recovered from 
the days when they put all evaluation in the 
untouchable class. I would like to see the exact 
reverse of this relationship come to pass. That is, I 
would like to see all standard social science texts 
being rewritten to treat the logic of evaluation as 
one of the key methodologies, like statistics and 
experimental design, that must be mastered in 
order to do all applied (and some pure) social 
science. In that way, good evaluation research 
designs will be the exemplar for much of social 
 science, instead of social science treating 
personnel or program evaluation as something 
they can do with their current resources, albeit 
conceding that there are some specialists in these 
sub-areas. That’s the view of evaluation fields as 
being satellites circling social science’s sun. I think 
a more appropriate model is the reverse. Social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The logic of evaluation means the process for identifying, 
defining, measuring, weighting, and—the key point—validating 
evaluative claims. The advanced logic of evaluation includes the 
process of setting up and applying a value system, which 
includes separating the axioms from the theorems, and using 
some inferences that go beyond deduction and statistical 
induction as valid schemas; and which can evaluate knowledge 
structures like disciplines, and metastructures like  science and 
the humanities or arts. 
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science is special, by comparison with the 
biological and physical sciences, just because it 
tackles the problems of humans in groups (by 
definition), and the key difference between 
humans in groups and molecules or planets in 
groups, is that the humans are at least partly 
driven by values, that is—according to social 
science—by internal phenomena unlike physical or 
biological phenomena where the phenomena as 
well as their effects are directly observable. Taking 
this step would incidentally narrow the gap 
between social science and history, already hard to 
define, but inaccurately located by the positivists’ 
map as reflecting social science’s lack of interest in 
particular cases, a non-existent crevasse. 
  
5.	  The	  Omega	  Role:	  Ethics	  as	  a	  Branch	  
of	  Evaluation	  	  
 
The third ‘necessary revolution’ proposal in my 
wish list is another territorial imperative move by 
evaluation. Making that move is a necessary 
consequence of the recognition that ethics is by 
definition just an applied field of evaluation, 
because it is about determining the right and 
wrong, good and bad of something, mainly human 
behavior and values. Ethics is closely related to 
policy analysis but with intertwined strands of 
personnel, program, and portfolio evaluation (e.g., 
time management). I’m pretty sure that the 
lessons we have learned in those four existing sub-
divisions of evaluation, when brought to bear on 
ethical problems, including what is often called 
‘the,’ or ‘the great,’ ethical problem (“Why should 
anyone be ethical?”) will yield new and improved 
results. Certainly we have to try out this kind of 
new approach, because we don’t seem to be 
making great progress under the present 
management i.e., departments of philosophy, 
while the ethical problems in our society persist 
and multiply. And, or instead, depending on your 
predilections, we may find the reverse effect, i.e., 
that the so-called ‘good reasons’ approach to ethics 
(e.g., Toulmin and Baier) can improve our 
performance in one or more of those four 
subdivisions of evaluation. I hope others will join 
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